R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company Building 256 – August 27, 1998

On August 27, 1998, a former tobacco factory complex in downtown Winston-Salem burned in a major fire that brought some 200 firefighters and most of the city fire department to the scene. It was battled for nearly seven hours, destroyed three large buildings, and closed a five-block area to traffic. Here are research notes on the incident, compiled from news reports and other sources.

See photos and clippings in this Google drive.

The Setting

  • August 27, 1998.
  • Winds 12 to 20 mph out of the north and northeast.
  • Gust up to 25 or 30 mph, fanned by remnants of Hurricane Bonnie.
  • High temperatures in low 90s.
     
  • R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company Building [Complex] No. 256.
  • Complex of four former tobacco factory buildings.
  • Built between 1911 and 1925 on the site of the former 1892 building and the first Reynolds plant.
  • The original factory was likely demolished or incorporated into the newer buildings.
     
  • Building #1 – Four and five-stories, 260 x 150 minus 90 x 30 courtyard.
  • Building #2 – Four stories, 80 x 70
  • Building #3 – Four stories, 240 x 120
  • Building #4 (Albert Hall) – Four stories, 170 x 90 + 70 x 120
  • Dimensions from 1957 Sanborn Maps.
     
  • With 420,000 square-feet, computed from above.
  • And 300,950 square-feet that burned.
  • Newspapers reported 500,000 square-feet.
  • Masonry construction with finished timber floors.
     
  • Factory closed in 1980s.
  • Property sold to county in 1990.
  • County sold to JDL Castle Corporation.
  • Site was being privately developed into a research park.

Building Under Renovation

  • Building(s) on north end was being renovated/redeveloped.
  • Middle section of complex was being demolished for a future parking garage.
     
  • Construction underway to restore the building, one month in progress.
  • Sprinkler system shut down during restoration.
  • Workers discovered fire in a pile of old timbers outside a ground-floor window.
  • They were redwood timbers from a cooler tower that had been removed from near the center of the building.
     
  • Workers attempted to extinguish with five-gallon buckets of water.
  • Others called for the water hose.
  • Wind whipped down the brick alleys and spread the fire into the building, through the open windows.
  • The 11-man crew of workers fled.
     
  • About 60 workers were inside when the fire started.
  • All evacuated safely.

First Alarm for Two Engines, Battalion Chief

  • Call received 10:36 a.m.
  • First alarm 10:37 a.m. for E1, E4, B1.
  • Aerial 2 was several blocks away, delivering a ventilation fan to a business. They observed a large column of smoke and added themselves to the call.
  • Aerial 2 first-arriving with a large rubbish fire behind the 256 building, flames extending through windowless (windows removed?) openings in the building.
  • Aerial 2 officer requested second alarm.
     
  • Second alarm 10:?? a.m. added E3, E5.
  • Aerial 1 added themselves after an earlier fire alarm.
  • Within nine minutes of first alarm, four engines, two aerial companies, and two command units were on scene.
     
  • After the second alarm request, command directed an attack from Patterson Street using master streams.

Special Call for Haz-Mat

  • Third alarm 10:52 a.m. added E6, E18.
  • Special call 10:54 a.m. for Aerial 3.
  • Special call ??:?? a.m. for Hazmat 1, due to reports of chemical and oxygen-acetylene tanks in the area.
  • The oxygen-acetylene tanks were in the building for cutting steel beams. At least one explosion later occurred during the fire.
  • Workers later moved barrels of chemicals out of the building, and just prior to a section of the structure collapsing.
     
  • Crews briefly attempted an interior attack, but withdrew due to heavy fire conditions inside.
  • The fire grew more intense and began moving floor to floor.
  • Command withdraw all interior operations and began concentrating on exposures.

Early Timeline

  • 10:36 a.m. – Call received
  • 10:37 a.m. – First alarm for E1, E4, B1.
  • 10:40 a.m. – E1 arrived.
  • 10:40 a.m. – E5 dispatched
  • 10:40 a.m. – A2 dispatched.
  • 10:41 a.m. – E18 changes from cold to hot response.
  • 10:42 a.m. – E18 arrived.
  • ~10:42 a.m. – A2 arrived.
  • 10:41 a.m. – A4 dispatched.
  • 10:42 a.m. – E3 dispatched
  • ~10:42 a.m. – Unit 1100 (aerial platform) requested, was returning to station from shop
  • 10:44 a.m. – E3 arrived
  • 10:44 a.m. – A3 dispatched.
  • ~10:45 a.m. – E5 arrived.
  • 10:59 a.m. – A3 arrived

Within 23 minutes, there were five engines and four ladders on scene.

Exposures

  • Two other buildings were adjacent to 256.
  • R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Factory #12 and Albert Hall
  • Each building was connected to the fire building(s) by breezeways on each of the four/five floors.
     
  • Crews entered Building 12 to investigate and prevent extension.
  • Reaching the breezeways, crews found heavy fire encroaching. With 2 ½-inch lines, they held the fire and prevented any extension to Building 12.
     
  • Albert Hall, to the south, housed condos and office suites. Historic building, 81 years old.
  • Crews entered and encountered active fires, high heat, and smoke.
  • Master streams were placed between Building 256 and Albert Hall to dampen some of the heavy fire.

Blasting Windows with Shotguns

  • Thick windows hampered efforts, made from a series of glass blocks.
  • Each block had two half-inch panes that were four inches apart. Each weighed about four pounds.
  • Deputies used pump-action shotguns to shatter the glass blocks.
  • Many of the blocks didn’t break until the third or fourth shot.
     
  • After flames came within 50 feet of the nearby Forsyth County Jail, officials moved 732 or 744 inmates to the Joel Coliseum Annex for the afternoon.
  • Alternate explanation for move, officials were concerned about inmates inhaling smoke.
  • Moving the inmates took one hour and no problems were reported during the move.
  • They began returning to the jail about 7:15 p.m., after the fire had been controlled.

Collapsing Walls, Wide Perimeter 

  • Sections of brick wall also collapsed, adding to cacophony of sounds that day.
  • Building collapses started by 1:30 p.m. 
  • Apparatus had to be moved at times, due to the fire shifting and walls collapsing.
     
  • Five-block area around the fire was shut down, during the entire operation.
  • Fire Chief contacted the city water department for more water, but because of a miscommunication, two tank trucks were instead sent to the scene. It took two hours before water pressure was “up to speed.”

Over 200 Firefighters on Scene

  • Mutual aid was requested to neighboring departments for personnel and equipment.
  • Kernersville and other county FDs responded, both on scene and with city coverage. [Need run card.]
  • WSFD issued department-wide call-back for all off-duty members.
     
  • By midafternoon, some 60 of 75 on-duty firefighters had responded.
  • Another 60 off-duty members and 50 or more county volunteers came to the scene.
  • Other VFDs moved to cover city stations, with only three of 14 city stations remaining with WSFD crews.
  • County units answered calls including a house fire elsewhere in the city, and grass fires from burning embers along Interstate 40.
     
  • Total force on scene: 170 firefighters, 13 engines, five ladders.
  • Alternate citation: 200+ city firefighters, including 120 off-duty. Also dozens of volunteer FFs. 

Controlled After Seven Hours

  • The fire burned for nearly eight hours.
  • Flames reached 20 feet into the air.
  • As walls and roofs collapsed, flames shot 100 feet into the air.
  • Smoke covered most of downtown and could be seen as far away as Davidson County.
  • Blowing embers sparked several grass fires along the shoulder of Interstate 40.
     
  • Fire was controlled at 5:30 p.m.
  • As night fell, they began releasing some of the crews.
  • Three of the four buildings had been destroyed, but the fire had been stopped into the adjacent buildings.
  • Heavy equipment including a construction crane with a metal tip was then used to topple the remain unstable walls, as well as the concrete sign over the building. Crane work started by 6:20 p.m.
      
  • Four aerial streams also flowed through the night.
  • The operating apparatus required on-scene fueling and constant checking.
  • Crews were rotated and the incoming shifts manned apparatus already in operation, wetting down the debris from the day before.

Injuries and Damage

  • There were a few injuries, but none that required hospitalizations.
  • One firefighter was treated for heat exhaustion, others were treated for minor injuries, including one hit by falling bricks.
  • “Most were fighting heat exhaustion after 10 minutes inside. The building was burning at 1300 to 1500 degrees and they were carrying 45 pounds or so of wet gear.”
  • “Some were so dehydrated that their tongues cracked in the heat.” [WSJ, 8/29/98]
     
  • Falling bricks damaged several fire trucks and nearby cars.
     
  • Except for Albert Hall, the Building 256 complex was a total loss.
  • It covered almost a city block and had a tax value of $720,000.
  • Building 12 and Albert Hall were both damaged. 
     
  • Albert Hall had 16 displaced businesses—including a photo studio, a catheter manufacturer, and other medical supply companies—and 13 condo residents.
  • Initially thought to be heavily damaged, Albert Hall suffered only smoke damage.
  • Building 12 housed the county General Services department and was connected to the complex by a metal walkway.
  • It sustained fire and water damage. 
     
  • Victoria Hall [?] was also damaged and later completely rebuilt.
  • A building on the opposite side of Albert Hall housed a research center and animals used by Wake Forest University were evacuated. The building was not damaged.

Causes and Spectators

  • Two stories circulated on the fire’s origin, carelessly discarded cigarette or spark from welding tool.
  • The Charlotte Observer reported the latter, that works with a cutting torch ignited wooden floor materials treated with flammable polyurethane coating.
     
  • Hundreds/thousands of spectators watched, coming from downtown offices. Others drove in to watch the fire, including former RJR employees.
  • Spectators also watched from along the railroad tracks behind the buildings.
  • Drivers also slowed along Interstate 40 and US 52 to watch the fire.
     
  • Legeros was adopting a cat in Raleigh that day and had an appointment that afternoon, or he would have made the drive when he heard the incident was unfolding.

Street Closures

Closed streets were:

  • First between Church and Salem
  • Second between Church and Chestnut
  • Third between Main and Patterson
  • Chestnut between Fourth and First
  • Church between Fourth and Second
  • Patterson between Salem and Belews

Lingering Questions

From the Winston-Salem Journal on August 29, 1998.

Q: Why didn’t WSFD borrow a helicopter to fight the fire?
A: Said the Fire Chief, it would have needed to come from Fort Bragg, and probably would have dropped water on the wrong building(s), due to the strong winds.

Q: Why didn’t it blow up the breezeways connecting the buildings, to better prevent fire spread?
A: That was great idea but we don’t have the equipment to do that, and not like “people see on TV.”

Q: Why didn’t they put a firefighter at the top of the aerial, to direct the water spray?
A: The heat was too intense. And it already burned some of the wiring on the aerial.

Q: Why did they leave a fire burning on one building’s roof?
A: Probably because command made the decision to concentrate efforts on a building that could be saved, instead of one that couldn’t be saved.

Sources

Various newspaper articles (to be expanded)

OSFM Fire & Rescue Journal, Volume 6-1, Winter 2008 (PDF)

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